Authors

Ex ante merger control in Russia: changes of efficiency if antitrust legislation

Competition policy: composition, structure, system

The article presents the basic parts of competition policy — protective and active competition policy, as well as competition advocating. Protective competition policy explains the content of the «hard antitrust core» and suppression of unfair competition. The article studies directions of active compe¬tition policy such as the development of competition in industries with a natural monopoly element, competition rules in the market with a state as a buyer, the decrease of redundant barriers for enter¬ing and leaving the market. Variants of correlation and interaction among instruments of protective and active competition policies taking into account differences in tough and soft force are shown in the article.

Trading in durable goods: a set of objects and limits of antitrust

Antitrust Law Enforcement in Aftermarkets: for Product Boundaries Estimates to Competition Advocacy

Two-sided markets: the subject matter specification

Priorities for competition policy in Russia until 2030

Structural Alternatives of the Method of Comparable Markets in Implementing Antitrust Law

Price Parallelism on Mobile Communication Markets: Three Interpretations

Removal of roaming in the EU: Lessons for Russia

National antitrust in a global context

Individual Abuse of Collective Dominance in Cellular Communications: Problems of Identification

Recently, discussions about the validity of the Russian practice of establishing the facts of individual abuse of collective dominance have been escalating: many experts point to a contradiction between the meaning of collective dominance, in which a small number of companies have a joint dominant position, in connection with each other, and the possibility of an individual company to abuse this position. The purpose of the article is to assess the correctness of this approach in the context of recent antitrust cases in the cellular communications market – in particular, two cases against the mobile operator “Tele2”. In the article, the applied practice is assessed in relation to the currently known results in the field of economic theory, as well as international best practices in the application of the concept of collective dominance. The findings indicate that the conclusion of the FAS Russia on the presence of the dominant position of Tele2 as part of collective dominance and the possibility of the company to exercise its market power does not correspond to either foreign practice or industrial organization theory. The source of error in the qualification of behavior is largely due to the focus of the antimonopoly authority on quantitative criteria of collective dominance to the detriment of the analysis of qualitative criteria and behavior. This case illustrates a typical tendency for such cases not to investigate the behavior of other collectively dominant market participants in relation to the behavior of the company accused of individual abuse, as well as not to investigate consumer behavior, and, in particular, their real possibilities to switch and switching actions. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme. Read more...

The Limits of the Study of Economic Evidence by Courts in Antimonopoly Cases: Grounds, Incentives and Constraints

Economic forensic examination is a means of achieving a better balance of errors of the first and second kind in law enforcement, but in itself depends on the incentives and capabilities of judges to assess the sufficiency of the grounds for its appointment. The purpose of any forensic examination is to obtain by the court, for the purposes of the administration of justice, special knowledge and information about a particular fact or phenomenon that is beyond the limits of legal science. It is antimonopoly legislation and law enforcement that can most clearly illustrate the fusion of legal and economic disciplines, where legal norms frame economic reality, forming a procedural contour for the court. The Court thus becomes the receiver of the standards of economic science, its approaches and rules. At the same time, it is shown that in reality the courts are faced with a difficult dilemma, on the one hand, compliance with procedural purity and, on the other hand, obtaining the necessary to improve the balance of errors of the first and second kind of economic evidence in terms of market research, determining the position of the economic entity that is the object of law enforcement, as well as the qualification of actions with the use of relevant theory of harm. The assessment of economic evidence by the courts should be based on a competent independent expert assessment and proceed from the categories of necessity and sufficiency. A set of imperfect substitutes for the assessment by the court of economic evidence on the merits is indicated. The article offers simple and practical approaches to the investigation by courts of economic facts and circumstances in order to make a correct, complete and reasoned decision on the antimonopoly case. Read more...

The Effect of the Interpretation of Company Behavior on the Analysis of Market Boundaries

The analysis of the state of competition in commodity markets is formally regulated by Order No. 220 of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia dated April 28, 2010 “On Approval of the Procedure for Analyzing the State of Competition in the Commodity Market”, but in reality, the mechanical adherence to the norms of this document is not enough, since all stages of the analysis, explicitly or implicitly, are based on a certain interpretation of the relationship and behavior of the defendant, the applicant and other affected persons. A vivid illustration is the situation with the provision of wired Internet services for tenants in shopping and entertainment centers. The relevance of this issue is ensured by the presence of antimonopoly cases, which consider the compliance of the provision of such services with antimonopoly legislation. The purpose of the study is to reveal, using the example of the markets for renting premises in shopping and entertainment centers and Internet communications, how the interpretation of the company’s behavior determines the approaches to assessing the boundaries of relevant markets. For this, alternative interpretations of the relationship and behavior of Internet providers (telecom operators), owners of shopping and entertainment centers and tenants are presented; grounds for the proposed interpretations are given; the consequences of applying alternative interpretations to identifying relevant markets and their further analysis in accordance with the requirements of the legislation are described; the key questions for research are highlighted, which can allow one to compare alternative interpretations and choose the one that best corresponds to the essence of the analyzed economic relations. As a result, we show that the analysis cannot ignore the connection between communication services providers, tenants as purchasers of communication services, and owners of shopping centers. Alternative interpretations of this connection are possible from the point of view of the economic essence of these relations and relevant theoretical concepts, but in any case, its economic nature should be studied, including for the purposes of the correct application of legal norms to assess the state of competition in the affected product markets Read more...

The Evolution of Antitrust Regulation of Joint Venture Agreements

Cooperation agreements between competitors can be an important tool for markets to adapt to external shocks, whether those are the consequences of a pandemic or economic sanctions. In this regard, the discussion of approaches to evaluating such agreements for admissibility from the point of view of antimonopoly legislation under current conditions is relevant. The purpose of the article is to assess the current state of antimonopoly control of cooperation agreements in Russia. To do this, we use the tools of the new institutional economic theory to analyze the history of the development of the regulation of such agreements. We reveal how modern sources of possible type I enforcement errors (the erroneous prohibition of agreements that actually contribute to the growth of public welfare) are connected with the history of institutional changes in the rules governing the analysis of cooperation agreements from the point of view of antimonopoly legislation. In particular, we show that the approaches to the analysis of cooperation agreements developed during the period of validity of a specific set of rules in 2011–2015 and summarized in the Clarifications of the Presidium of the FAS Russia on the procedure and methodology for analyzing cooperation agreements (2013) currently create an overly strict control regime for such agreements after the changes in the antimonopoly law that took place in 2015. The importance of solving this problem is demonstrated in light of the ability of companies to use cooperation to mitigate the consequences of external shocks, including economic sanctions. Structural alternatives to the control of such agreements are formulated that are applicable to various actual forms of agreements between competitors, which could contribute to a better adaptation of market participants to changing conditions. Read more...