About journal

Editorial Board

Journal archive

For authors

Useful links

Contacts

Authors

< Back to the list of authors

Levina E.

Degree	Senior Lecturer Department of Microeconomic Analysis, National research university "Higher School of Economic"
E-mail	levina_hse@mail.ru
Location	Moscow
Articles	The competition on the infrastructure markets Some market area estimation features are described in the article for the markets where production is transmitted only one method. The tariff policy and state adjustment influence on market’s competitive researching is investigated. Some updating to method of market’s competitive researching are suggested. Read more... Measure to assess market dominance and Herfindahl–Hirschman index. Characteristics comparison and applications Widely used in the antitrust laws Herfindahl–Hirschman Index evaluates the level of market concentration. However, it fails to say whether the share of one or more firms is so high that it leads to high monopoly prices. This encourages researchers to propose new methods of assessing the level of market power. The article deals with one of these new criteria proposed by Melnik A., Shy O., Stenbacka R. In contrast to Hirschman–Herfindahl index characterizing concentration measure of the industry a new measure helps to determine whether the firm has a dominant position. Undeniable advantages criterion is that its use requires only the shares of the two largest players in the market and that it takes into account the characteristics of the market such as entry barriers. Markets are characterized for which the criterion for dominance and the Herfindahl — Hirschman index give different assessment of the competitive environment. Both indicators are used to assess competition level for Russian coal market. Russian coal market is described to the extent necessary for the task. Some aspects and restrictions of terms «geographic market» and «product market» are revealed. Read more... Lobbying for protection by oligopolists and lobbying coordination The agents with the similar purposes of lobbying are interested in coordination of their lobbying efforts. Nevertheless, the free rider problem often takes place. In the article the problem of the free rider is illustrated on the example of lobbying for protection by the domestic oligopolists acting as Cournot rivals. It is shown that in the equilibrium with voluntary contribution only firms with smallest marginal costs or greatest marginal costs contribute. As a result, total lobbying expenditure is less than optimum level defined as total domestic oligopolists profit maximization problem solution. Total lobbying expenditures is optimal under share equilibrium and Groves-Clarke mechanism. Read more... Cournot competition vs. Bertrand competition: the choice of a strategic variable. The case of Russian automobile market The paper analyzes oligopolistic competition in a market for a differentiated product. A comparative analysis of competition models by Cournot (output competition) and Bertrand (price competition) under prerequisites put forward by the authors shows that under Bertrand competition the price level will be lower. Whereas interrelation between firms output and profit is ambiguous (if goods produced are substitutes), and depend, other things being equal, on the attractiveness of the good offered by the firm. The results obtained are illustrated using Russia’s automotive market review. In particular, an attempt is made to classify some decisions made by car producers as the one or the other competition strategy analyzed in the theoretical part of the paper. Read more... Product line and price discrimination: a theory perspective and a view from the markets The paper is focused on nonlinear pricing, price discrimination and their implementation in actual markets. The introductory section uses simple examples to describe the basic notions and types of price discrimination. Section 2 reviews the main theories behind nonlinear pricing and summarizes the existing results with a focus on consumer choice for those consumers who are keen on quality. It allows the authors in Section 3 to move further to analyze the issues of «prestige» and conspicuous consumption, especially in the case when the sellers exercise their market power over buyers through brands and reputation. Section 4 shows how theoretical results are actually implemented in the automobile market. In particular, the paper shows that cars originating from countries with an established reputation as automobile manufacturers (UK, Germany, Sweden) get the highest markup in the market compared to the basic case. Moreover, the analysis of practical methods used in the Russian car market confirms that car dealers manage to sell automobiles as close to consumer reserve prices as possible, employing all types of price discrimination. Read more...