Authors
Yusupova G. F.
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Degree
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National Research University Higher School of Economics |
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E-mail
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GYusupova@hse.ru |
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Location
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Moscow |
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Articles
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Russian market price unification trendsThe article is dedicated to the Russian inter-regional competition intensity assessments. The wheat market is examined to check the unified price-setting hypothesis. The empirical data shows that the Russian grain market cannot be called harmonized as there are barriers that hamper the price gap-bridging process in the regions. The article demonstrates how the regional month-to-month price change data, transportation cost data and the interregional trade volume change data can be used to identify the trends emerged in the Russian national market development and the factors that influence the trend building process.
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Russian antimonopoly policy: the competition-hampering collusive agreements and the counteraction issuesCollusive agreement and tacit collusion problem is one of the most complex issues that both the legal professionals who deal with the competitive businesses and the antimonopoly officials face both in Russia and in all the countries of the world. How should we assess the achievements made by the RF Federal Antimonopoly Service? What should we do to put an end to the cartel agreement and tacit agreement-making practices? These were the issues discussed during a roundtable dis¬cussion organized by the Institute for Modern Development. The roundtable discussion title theme was The Collusive Agreements and the Tacit Collusion. Economists, legal professionals (including the practitioners who operate as defense counselors), executive bodies' and large businesses' representatives took part in the work during the discussion. The discussion was dedicated to the tacit agreement-making countering measures and the Russian antimonopoly policy elaboration issues. The discussion results can be of interest and of help to the economists who specialize in dealing with a wide range of economic issues.
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Antimonopoly cases against Russian oil companies (2008-2009): new goals and measures of government policy?One of the leading problems about application of rule against collective domination's excessive use (in the form of high prices) is the problem of proving, that established price level is caused exactly by companies' monopoly behavior. During commenced in autumn of 2008 in Russia cases against oil companies such proofs were not provided, anti-monopoly authority and courts mainly based themselves upon data about ratio between world oil prices' dynamics and retail oil-products prices' dynamics. This article' aim is to analyse effectiveness and foundation of Antimonopoly Legislation's application for the purpose of counteraction against high prices at Russian oil-products' markets. Read more...Practical work on «theory of branch markets" courseThe submitted materials — a set of tasks (practical work) — are aimed at solidifying students' knowl¬edge on the «Firm and Market Theory: Discussions and Historical Development topic which intro¬duces the «Theory of Branch Markets» course. The course is held in the Higher School of Economics for a Bachelor Degree in Economics and is an integral part of the professional cycle in the educational program for an economist. The tasks are based on students' general knowledge of Microeconomics, Introductory Sketch of the Game Theory, History of Economic Thought. Read more...Theory of branch markets and regulation of natural monopoliesThe article continues series of studying-methodical materials for « Theory of branch markets* course. This publication presents materials about development of conception of natural monopolies: its origins, sustainability, tariff regulation of natural monopolies. There are some case-studies inside dedicated to the problems of development of competition in industries of natural monopolies. Read more...Strategic interaction of firms in the short and long termThe article continues series of studying-methodical materials for «Theory of industrial organization" course. This publication presents materials about strategic behavior of firms in oligopolistic markets with differentiated and homogeneous products. There are some case-studies inside dedicated to the problems of price formation and deterrence of entry on market. Read more...Collusion: economic theory and antitrust policyThe article continues series of studying-methodical materials for «Theory of industrial organization" course. This publication presents materials about factors influencing the incentives of firms to coop¬erate and set agreements. There are some case-studies inside dedicated to the problems of antitrust policy against collusive firms. Read more...Behavior of large sellersThe article continues series of studying-methodical materials for «Theory of industrial organization** course. This publication presents materials, analyzing the behavior of large sellers in the market. In particular, the exercises are considered the causes and consequences of special forms of rela¬tionship between producers and sellers in the market — vertical integration and vertical restrictive contracts and behavior of the sellers of differentiated products and price discrimination. Read more...Researches, innovations and patentThe article continues series of studying-methodical materials for «Theory of industrial markets» course. This publication presents materials which devote to the analysis such as the influence of the innovative activity of participants on the market structure, and on the contrary the influence of market structure on the innovative activity of companies. In this article there are the tasks devoted to the problems which illustrate how the innovative activity is developing. Read more...Network and standardsThe article finishes the series of studying-methodical materials for «Theory of industrial markets» course. This publication presents materials which devote to Network economics. In this article there are the tasks devoted to the problems of competition on the Network markets. Read more...Auction is a sufficient condition of competition? Collusion is in the market of bidding ringsAntitrust legislation of many countries admits horizontal agreements between market participants as illegal per se not only in case of price fixing, market sharing, but also in case of bid-riggings. This paper presents a review and an academic assessment of market participants behavior at auctions by bidding. Such behavior creates incentives to collude and to sustain a collusion but with some features which are suitable for auctions. These suitable features for auctions are in detail described in the paper of R. Preston Mcafee and John Mcmillan «Bidding Ring». In order to collude, the bidders must resolve their asymmetric-information problem: they must have some way of selecting a winner and a winning bid. So the main characteristic of auction by bidding is asymmetric-information. The knowledge is non-uniform distributed between the parties to the con- tract: the seller does not know a demand of auction by bidding participants. Otherwise the seller would know what price it is worth to set. In our paper we used these features and the conditions of collusion’ sustainability to give academic assessment of market participants behavior at the auctions by bidding. We showed that the cartel sustainability in the conditions of e-auction corresponds to balance of profit and expected fine imposed in the case of cartel detection but not corresponds to discount factor as an indicator of «cartel sustainability». The cases of Russian antitrust practice which are devoted to the auction by bidding in the pharmaceutical market gave us an opportunity to show how the firms use the price strategies to keep the prices at the rate which give them to earn monopoly profits.
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Market boundaries and competition peculiarities in the markets of Visa and Master Card services: the lessons of antitrust law applicationThe uniform approach to identify the markets like market of payment systems’ services (two-sided
markets with network effects) has not been presented yet in the modern economic and law literature.
There is also no unique answer to the basic question — how the boundaries of such a market
should be identified. This paper describes the features of two-sided markets with network effects,
presents a review of cases of foreign antitrust authorities against payment systems, and also the
characteristics of market identification in these cases.
The performed analysis allowed drawing a conclusion on the application of the universal rules, similar
to those described in The Procedure of competitive situation analysis in the product markets, in the
antitrust policy. The procedure of economic analysis in the markets with the special structures can
go far beyond the strict rules described in this Procedure and can require using of more instruments.
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Leniency Program against collusion in the Russian marketsMost of collusion participants have incentives to commit to collusion because of their high estimations
of future profits. However Leniency Program can affect incentives of collusion participants
through the analysis of market structure changes. The analyses of Leniency Program effects on stability
and duration of collusions increases the efficiency both the work of the antimonopoly authority
and the antimonopoly policy in general.
The described method in the article estimated the impact of Leniency Program on the behavior
of market participants based on Russian data on detected collusions and their characteristics in
2004 – 2011.
Rule of full immunity for every application, introduced by 2007 edition of Leniency Program in
Russia, supports incentives to commit to collusion, instead of refraining from illegal price fixing or
market sharing. But the edition of Leniency Program that has been in place since 2009, in contrast,
enhances profitability of deviation from collusion, making collusions unstable. The improved version
of Leniency Program in 2009 had an impact on collusion participants which can be corresponded to
high sanctions in spite of the actual sanctions had been low. So even in highly imperfect jurisdiction
where the fight with collusions is weak, Leniency Program can have independent significant and can
present as an effective tool.
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