Authors
Makarov A.
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Degree
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Research assistant IIMS HSE, Postgraduate student, Faculty of Economics, HSE |
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E-mail
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andreymakarovh@mail.ru |
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Articles
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Transformation of antitrust policy in transition economies: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan. Collusion problemThis article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the creation of antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice, in particular, unique features in the use of «rule of reason» approach. Also were shown problems that still remain actual for transition economies in this area, including the problem of cooperation between competition authority and police system and the standard of proof problem in the case of collusion. These countries in the early 90th were in similar socio-economic conditions and were forced to create completely new institutions in the field of protection of competition. It is shown that existing quantitative ratings of competition can’t be regarded as certain final assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. The article proposes a special approach to evaluation of preventing col- lusion mechanisms, based on the institutional analysis. This approach takes into account such enforcement problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions («per se» vs «rule of reason»), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
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Competition policy in transition economies: collusion problem in CEEThis article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of anti- trust system was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. The analysis takes into account such institutional problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, ver- tical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions («per se» vs «rule of reason»), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
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